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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
ELZA E. MILLER, 
Defendant/AppelIant. 
Case No. 890428-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked under the 
authority cited by Appellant in his Brief. 
An information filed in the court below on April 19, 1989, 
charged the Appellant with disorderly conduct in violation of 
Sec. 76-9-102 (1) (b) (i) , St. George City Code as adopted. The 
City Code adopted verbatim the section with corresponding number 
from the Utah Code Annotated. The Respondent plead not guilty, 
and the case was tried before the court on May 25, 1989. The 
Appellant was adjudged guilty of the offense charged, an 
infraction, and was ordered to pay a $500.00 fine with $400.00 
thereof suspended for one year on condition that the Appellant 
comport himself as a law-abiding citizen. 
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II, ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient 
to support a finding that the Appellant engaged in threatening 
behavior. 
2. Whether Miller's verbal conduct is protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and by Article 1, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
3, Whether the trial court's exclusion of encounters 
between the Appellant and one of the Respondent's witnesses on 
other occasions remote from the incident at issue in order to 
show bias was prejudicial error, 
4, Whether the trial court's exclusion of encounters 
between the Appellant and one of the Respondent's witnesses on 
other occasions remote from the incident at issue in order show 
provocation was prejudicial error, 
III, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES AND RULES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Amendment I, Constitution of the United States: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. 
Section 76-9-102(1)(b)(i), St. George City Code as adopted: 
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, intending to 
cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he engages in fighting 
or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior. 
_ 9 _ 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 (c): 
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of 
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Testimony at trial showed that the Appellant (hereinafter 
"Miller") and the Respondent's (hereinafter "City") witnesses are 
residents of a mobile home subdivision consisting of private lots 
delineated to some extent by walls or fences. Evidence showed 
that five or six of the neighbors gathered in the backyard of the 
lot directly behind Miller on a Sunday afternoon where they 
engaged in or watched a game of horseshoes. The backyard 
containing the horseshoe pit was fenced (chain link) and 
separated from Miller's yard by an easement ten feet (10') wide 
and another chain link fence (Miller's). 
The evidence is in conflict as to events thereafter except 
in one area: Miller screamed things at the City's witnesses. 
This was testified to by the three witnesses and by Miller 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 58, 1. 9-15). The City witnesses 
testified Miller began yelling at them; Miller testified that 
one of the neighbors began yelling at him first. The City's 
witnesses testified to specific threats and insults yelled by 
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Miller (Transcript of Trial, p. 10, 1. 13-19; p. 11, 1. 1-2, p. 
22, 1. 2-6; and p. 29, 1. 15-24), while they denied any 
provocation or adverse response to Miller. On the other hand, 
Miller was unable to relate a specific statement made to him 
except for the words "hey, Ernie". (Transcript of Trial, p. 44, 
I. 2-3 and p. 58, 1. 12-15) The City's witnesses agreed that 
reference was made to a gun (Transcript of Trial, p. 22, 1. 3-4) 
and to shooting the witnesses (Transcript of Trial, p. 10, 1. 1-
5; p. 22, 1. 1-6; and p. 30, 1. 17-18). The City's witnesses 
testified that Miller's threats and behavior was both annoying 
and alarming (Transcript of Trial, p. 11, 1. 3-9; p. 23, 1. 10-
II, and p. 30, 1. 19-25). 
The c o u r t found M i l l e r g u i l t y of engag ing in t h r e a t e n i n g 
b e h a v i o r i n t e n d e d t o cause p u b l i c annoyance or a l a r m . 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Words alone can c o n s t i t u t e conduct or behavior without 
a c c o m p a n y i n g p h y s i c a l a c t i o n . The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y 
determined tha t M i l l e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s made over an a p p r e c i a b l e 
number of minutes amounted to d i r e c t t h r e a t s and were s u f f i c i e n t 
evidence of a v i o l a t i o n of the o r d i n a n c e . 
B . To be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e C i t y o r d i n a n c e must be 
i n t e r p r e t e d as r e q u i r i n g t h r e a t e n i n g b e h a v i o r , i f i t c o n s i s t s 
s o l e l y of w o r d s , to t ake t h e form of in f l ammatory remarks 
i n t e n d i n g to i n c i t e an immedia te b r e a c h of the p e a c e . The 
remarks of M i l l e r meet the r e q u i r e m e n t of the o r d i n a n c e so 
i n t e r p r e t e d . 
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C. The trial court acknowledged an awareness of animosity 
between Miller and one of the witnesses, and it properly refused 
to take evidence of different, remote incidents involving those 
parties as it could only serve to further demonstrate the same 
animosity. 
D. The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in 
refusing to allow testimony about other incidents at other times 
in order to show provocation, for the reason that (1) provocation 
not occurring on that date would be too remote, and (2) 
provocation is not made a defense by the ordinance in any event. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT MILLER 
ENGAGED IN THREATENING BEHAVIOR. 
1. What Constitutes Threatening Behavior? Miller 
argues that his threats were verbal and therefore not behavior; 
Miller equates "behavior" with physical action other than speech. 
The Oregon court cited by Miller is one of the few that 
adopts this position. As pointed out by the court in People v. 
Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 NYS 54, and in People v. Harvey, 307 
NY 588, 123 N.E.2d 81, threatening behavior may be either verbal 
or by action. The normal connotation of "behavior" is conduct. 
Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796. 
That would seem to be true in Utah as well where the offense is 
titled and normally referred to as "disorderly conduct". Most 
cases hold verbal threats to constitute "conduct". People v. 
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Davis , 151 111 . App.3d 435, 502 NE2d 780. A u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t ' s 
s p e e c h e x h o r t i n g o t h e r s t o i n t e r f e r e wi th the a c t i o n s of 
u n i v e r s i t y a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t ranscended mere express ion of opinion 
and became "conduct" . S iege l v . Regents of Univ. of C a l i f o r n i a , 
D.C. Ca l , 308 F . S u p p . 832, 837 . See a l s o c a s e s c i t e d in 12 
Amjur2d, Breach of Peace and D i s o r d e r l y Conduct, Sec . 37. In the 
c a s e a t hand, i t i s l e g a l l y p o s s i b l e for M i l l e r ' s words t o 
c o n s t i t u t e " t h r e a t e n i n g behavior" wi thout accompanying phys i ca l 
a c t i o n . 
The i s s u e of whether v e r b a l b e h a v i o r or conduc t can be 
p r o h i b i t e d without in f r ing ing upon o n e ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to 
freedom of speech i s d iscussed by the Ci ty in Sect ion B, below, 
and by Mil ler in h i s Sect ion D. 
2 . M i l l e r ' s Words A r e P r o p e r l y C h a r a c t e r i z e d As 
Threa t en ing . 
This i s s t r i c t l y a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n based on the test imony 
of what was said by Mil le r a t the t ime , and the lower c o u r t ' s 
f inding t h a t the language c o n s t i t u t e d t h r e a t e n i n g behavior should 
not be over turned un les s found t o be c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . The 
"c l ea r and e r roneous" s tandard i s r equ i r ed by Utah Rule of C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 52 and i s confirmed by the reasoning in Anderson v. 
Bessemer C i t y , 470 U .S . 564 , 105 S . C t . 1504, 84 L.Ed2d 518 
( 1 9 8 5 ) . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t M i l l e r ' s t h r e a t s were 
accompanied by opprobriums, p r o f a n i t y , and r e l i g i o u s and r a c i a l 
s l u r s (T ransc r ip t of T r i a l , p . 10, 1 . 1 0 - 1 9 ) . His langauge 
- 6 -
should also be considered in a context where his wife was behind 
him in the window of their home, apparently backing him up with a 
gun (Transcript of Trial, p. 9, 1. 22-25; p. 10, 1. 1-5. Also 
p. 36, 1. 9-12). Additionally, the trial court was able to 
observe Millerfs attitude and demeanor on the witness stand, and 
to the extent that he may have displayed belligerence or a 
potential for irrational behavior, the trial court was entitled 
to take that into consideration. 
Miller's statements in the context presented to the court 
were clearly threatening, regardless of the fact that in some 
instances they were prefaced by "ought" or "could". For example, 
the statement: "I have a gun and I could blow all your heads off 
. " (Transcript of Trial, p. 24, 1. 10-25) can very 
reasonably be understood by the hearer to be a present threat, 
and use of the word "could" may well communicate the idea that 
Miller was entertaining an immediate intention of using a gun. 
The witnesses referred to Miller's statements as threats 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 18, 1. 12-17, and p. 29, 1. 18-24) and 
explained why, in this context, his statements amounted to 
threats (Transcript of Trial, p. 11, 1. 9-24). The threat to 
shoot the witnesses was testified to not only by witness 
Pendleton but corroborated by witness Benson (Transcript of 
Trial, p. 30, 1. 15-24). There was also testimony, of course, of 
d irect threats as well that were not prefaced by "could" or 
"ought" (Transcript of Trial, p. 30, 1. 17 & 18, and p, 31, 1. 
14-16). ~ 
B. MILLER'S WORDS BY THEIR VERY UTTERANCE TEND TO INCITE AN 
IMMEDIATE BREACH OF THE PEACE. 
Miller at the trial argued that the disorderly conduct 
ordinance is unconstitutional as it infringes on his rights to 
freedom of expression, apparently referring to the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 
I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution (Transcript of Trial, p. 4, 
1. 10-14). Unconstitutionality is not raised as a point on 
appeal; rather Miller's Section VII(D) seems to argue that the 
statutory words "threatening behavior" are constitutional only if 
they are interpreted to refer to speech which presents a clear 
and present danger of imminent violence or a breach of the peace. 
Miller then urges the Court to consider the words spoken by him 
on the Sunday afternoon in March, 1989, which gave rise to the 
criminal charges as not coming within the meaning of "threatening 
behavior" as so interpreted. It is the position of the City that 
Miller's words did constitute such "threatening behavior". 
The type of speech which is beyond the protection of the 
First Amendment is characterized by some cases as "fighting 
words". The case first using this description and cited by all 
succeeding cases in the area is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
(1942), 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031, where the 
Court found that "the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned 
facist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to 
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." As such, 
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they are not safeguarded by the Constitution. Quoting the lower 
court, the Supreme Court stated: 
"The test is what men of common intelligence would 
understand would be words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight . . . The English language has a 
number of words and expressions which by general 
consent are 'fighting words' when said without a 
disarming smile . . . Such words, as ordinary men 
know, are likely to cause a fight." 
"Threatening behavior" under the Utah statute must consist of 
words of this type, and the facts in evidence show that Miller's 
statements are the "classical fighting words" referred to in 
Chaplinsky. In addition, as stated by the Arizona Supreme Court 
in affirming a conviction under that state's disorderly conduct 
in State v. Brahy, 529 P.2d 263: 
"The utterances by the defendant in this case are not 
an essential part of the exposition of ideas and are 
of such slight social value that any benefit derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in peaceful and nonoffensive conduct. A statement by 
the Court in Starsky has equal application here: 
'Actions such as these are not an exercise of rights 
but rather are an abuse of rights and entail a gross 
lack of understanding - or calloused indifference -
to the simple fact that the offended parties also 
have certain rights under the same Constitution.' 
106 Ariz, at 333, 475 P.2d at 946." 
Miller's statements were not merely expressions of opinion as 
argued in his Brief. For example, where Mr. Westfall on cross-
examination asks specifically what Miller said, witness Benson 
recalls a pronouncement of intention to take immediate, direct 
action (Transcript of Trial, p. 31, 1. 11-16). That perception 
by the witnesses from the content, tone and context of Miller's 
words make them fighting words whether or not he at times 
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prefaced them with an "ought to". On no reasonable basis can 
they be afforded constitutional protection. 
C. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN 
MILLER AND ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE 
COURT. 
The court indicated that it was aware of animosity between 
Miller and witness Pendleton because of prior occurrences 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 14, 1. 15-17, and p. 40, 1. 19-20, and 
p. 50, 1. 15-16). The only purpose under Utah Rule of Evidence 
608(c) for evidence of animosity between Miller and Pendleton, 
would be to show a motive on the part of a witness to 
misrepresent, and the judge clearly indicated that he was aware 
of that animosity. To the extent that it may have influenced 
Pendleton's testimony, the judge was able to take it into 
account. Going into past incidents would not serve to make the 
judge any more aware of existing animosity, and further evidence, 
perhaps lengthy, of confrontations giving rise to that animosity 
would be unnecessary. While the court cannot normally take 
judicial notice of previous proceedings between the same parties, 
the court is not precluded from an awareness that both civil and 
criminal matters involving the same parties have been before it 
previously so as to provide an awareness of pre-existing 
animosity between those parties. That awareness of possible bias 
arising out of a witnesses1 animosity would make additional 
information produced through cross-examination unlikely to affect 
-10-
t h e j u d g e ' s a b i l i t y t o a p p r a i s e the wi tnesses 1 t es t imony, and 
even if the cour t committed e r r o r in denying the admis s ion of 
such a d d i t i o n a l ev idence , i t was harmless and not p r e j u d i c i a l . 
S t a t e v , Rammel (Utah 1986) 721 P.2d 498; S t a t e v . Hackford 
(Utah 1987) 737 P.2d 200. 
M i l l e r d id no t make a p ro f fe r of evidence t h a t there had 
been c o l l u s i o n between the C i t y ' s w i t n e s s e s or o t h e r e v i d e n c e 
t h a t might have m a t e r i a l l y a f fec ted the outcome of the t r i a l . I t 
was apparent from the p r o f f e r s made t o the Court t h a t M i l l e r 
wanted to i n t r o d u c e s t a t e m e n t s made a t other times by wi tness 
P e n d l e t o n , and they could on ly show b i a s as a w i t n e s s o r , 
p e r h a p s , i n d i r e c t p rovoca t ion , because of the animosi ty between 
the p a r t i e s (Transc r ip t of T r i a l , p . 4 1 , 1. 8-11, and p . 51, 1 . 
4 - 6 ) . D e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e t r i a l judge t ha t such a d d i t i o n a l 
evidence of animosi ty was not necessary in no way c o n s t i t u e s a 
d e n i a l to Mi l le r of h i s r i g h t to confront wi tnesses a g a i n s t him. 
S u f f i c i e n t c ross -examina t ion was allowed of the C i t y ' s wi tnesses 
t o s a t i s f y the S i x t h Amendment. The e f f o r t s t o go in to the 
h i s t o r y of r e l a t i o n s between M i l l e r and w i t n e s s P e n d l e t o n 
occurred not on c ross -examina t ion but on the d i r e c t examination 
by Mi l l e r of h i s own a t t o r n e y . Even where a l i m i t a t i o n was 
imposed d u r i n g c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , such cross-examinat ion must 
meet a th reshhold t e s t of re levance to the i s sues being t r i e d , 
and t he r e i s no v i o l a t i o n of the Sixth Amendment for the cour t to 
f o r e c l o s e tes t imony which does not add to knowledge of a 
- 1 1 -
witness's reliability or events of the specific case. United 
States v. Young (1981f Ca 5 Tex), 655 F.2d 624. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY REFUSE MILLER THE 
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATION. 
While several efforts are made to introduce evidence of 
prior brushes between Miller and witness Pendleton, the only time 
Miller indicated that such evidence was intended to show 
provocation was denying him direct examination as to what caused 
him to change his opinion about witness Pendleton (Transcript of 
Trial, p. 40 entire). The trial court rejected the testimony, 
indicating that provocation would have to be "occasion specific. 
That is, it would have to arise from this particular occasion." 
That position is reasonable and does not constitute error. 
Initially, it should be observed that provocation is not 
made an essential element of the offense by statute, and the 
cases generally hold that it is not a good defense in 
prosecutions of this type. 12 Amjur2d, Breach of Peace and 
Disorderly Conduct, Sec. 10. Disorderly conduct is not a common-
law crime, but rather is created by and dependent upon the 
wording of the statute itself. 
While no cases can be found to show that provocation may 
justify disorderly conduct, it is the general rule in assault and 
battery cases that provocation is not a defense. 
"Provocation, however serious, is not considered a 
justification for a criminal assault, where the 
assault took place after the lapse of a sufficient 
cooling time." 6 AmJur2d, Assault and Battery, 
Sec. 61. 
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While disorderly conduct is less serious than assault, there is 
no more reason why it should be justified by incidents occurring 
at an earlier time than in the case of an assault. The trial 
judge was correct in not allowing testimony of events that did 
not occur on the day in question. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Words alone may be conduct or behavior, particularly 
where they are buttressed by an apparent ability to take physical 
action. 
The St. George disorderly conduct ordinance must be 
interpreted to include, as a violation, only those epithets or 
threats that amount to "fighting words". The trial court, by 
finding Miller guilty, considered his words to have been uttered 
in a provocative manner so as to create a clear and present 
danger that violence might erupt. The court is entitled to 
consider the surrounding facts and circumstances, and if it finds 
that threats are unwarranted and abusive so as to create alarm 
and incite the average hearer to retaliatory self-defense or 
other action which will breach the peace, those threats are not 
afforded the protection of the First Amendment. Miller's remarks 
were clearly behavior of a type not protected, and the judgment 
of the trial court based thereon should not be overturned unless 
found to be clearly erroneous. 
The trial court did not err in limiting testimony to the 
events of the day in question. Provocation for these particular 
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statements that may have occurred on prior dates was properly 
held to be remote. Evidence of animosity beyond that already 
recognized by the court in order to show the bias of a witness 
was properly excluded by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, as 
permitted by Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 
Appellant Miller has failed to show prejudicial error or 
other ground for reversal of the judgment in the trial court, and 
it should be affirmed. 
DATED this
 NOctQt5eT>^19 89. 
T. W. SHUMWAY 
Attorney for City of St. George' 
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